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In recent years, cases in which state governments chose to override federal environmental regulation
with tighter regulations of their own have become increasingly common, even for pollutants that have
substantial spillovers across states.  This paper argues that this change arose at least in part because
of a shift in the type of regulation used at the federal level, from command-and-control regulation
toward more incentive-based regulation.  Under an incentive-based federal regulation, a state imposing
a tighter regulation will bear only part of the additional cost, and thus has more incentive to tighten
regulation than it does under federal command-and-control. This difference helps to explain observed
patterns of regulation.  In addition, it has implications for the choice of regulatory instruments.  For
a pollutant that causes both local and spillover damage, a federal pollution tax is likely to yield a more
efficient outcome than federal command-and-control policy or a federal system of tradable permits.
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Early in the history of U.S. environmental regulation by the federal government, cases in 
which state governments chose to override federal regulation with tighter regulations of their 
own on the same pollutant were quite rare.  In recent years, however, these cases have become 
more common, even for pollutants that have substantial spillovers across states (and thus for 
which one would expect the federal government to regulate more aggressively).  Moreover, 
when California attempted in the mid-to-late 2000’s to impose its own car and truck fuel-
economy regulations, the federal government acted to block those rules.  Why have these 
conflicts in environmental regulation become more common? 
This paper argues that this change arose at least in part because of a shift in the type of 
regulation used at the federal level, from command-and-control regulation toward more 
incentive-based regulation.  These two types of regulation at the federal level provide 
substantially different incentives for state regulation.  Under federal command-and-control, a 
state that imposes a tighter standard than the federal government will bear the full cost of that 
tighter standard.  In contrast, under an incentive-based federal regulation, a state imposing a 
tighter regulation will bear only part of the additional cost, because of an offsetting reduction in 
emissions taxes paid or emissions permits bought within the state.  Consequently, under 
incentive-based federal regulation, states will be much more inclined to impose their own tighter 
policies than under federal command-and-control. 
Prior work on environmental federalism has not recognized this difference.  Most models 
in the environmental federalism literature assume that all regulations take the form of emissions 
caps, rather than incentive-based policies.  And the relatively small number of environmental 
federalism papers that compare the effects of incentive-based and command-and-control 
regulation (e.g., Wellisch, 1995) assume that regulation is done entirely by the federal   2 
government or entirely by state governments, but do not consider the case in which both levels of 
government can choose to regulate the same pollutant. 
By pointing out this difference and exploring its implications, this paper makes three 
main contributions.  First, this difference helps to explain observed patterns of regulation, and 
thus improves our understanding of environmental regulation in a federal system.  Second, 
recognizing this difference helps to guide policy.  One implication of these results is that for a 
pollutant that causes local damage and also has inter-state spillovers, a federal pollution tax is 
likely to yield a more efficient outcome than federal command-and-control policy or a federal 
system of tradable permits. 
The third contribution is broader: the simple framework developed in this paper could 
also be applied to look at issues of federalism in contexts other than environmental policy.  For 
example, the comparison between unfunded mandates and matching grants in the context of 
public good provision is analogous to the comparison between command-and-control regulations 
and environmental taxes. 
The next section of this paper introduces a very simple model of environmental 
regulation in a federal system.  The following three sections use that model to analyze cases in 
which only the national government can regulate emissions, cases in which only the state 
governments can regulate, and cases in which both levels of government can regulate the same 
pollutant simultaneously.  A final section concludes and discusses policy implications and 
avenues for future research. 
I. A Simple Model 
  This section introduces a very simple model of environmental regulation in a federal 
setting.  It considers one large jurisdiction made up of N smaller jurisdictions.  Throughout the   3 
paper, I will refer to the large jurisdiction as a nation and the smaller jurisdictions as states.  But 
this is just convenient terminology: the model is general, and could just as easily represent 
nations within a larger federation, as in the European Union, or towns within a state.   
Emissions from state i are denoted as ei .  The cost of emissions reductions in state i is 
given by the function 
(1)  Ci ei ( ), 
which is decreasing and concave in ei , or in other words, achieving a lower level of emissions 
implies a higher cost, and the marginal cost of reducing emissions rises as the level of emissions 
falls.  For simplicity, assume that the second derivative of Ci ei ( ) is constant and is equal across 
all states (i.e., the marginal cost of emissions reductions is linear and has the same slope for 
every state).
1 
  This cost function could represent many different methods for reducing emissions, from 
reducing output from polluting industries or consumption of polluting goods to installing end-of-
pipe emissions control equipment. 
  One key implicit assumption embodied in this function is that the cost of achieving a 
given reduction in emissions is the same under command-and-control as under incentive-based 
regulation.  There are many reasons why this might not be the case.  For example, incentive-
based regulations induce a cost-effective allocation across different methods of reducing 
emissions, whereas achieving a similarly cost-effective allocation under command-and-control 
requires the regulator to know the details of firms’ cost functions. But assuming away any such 
cost differences allows this paper to focus on other important differences between command-
and-control and incentive-based regulation. 
                                                 
1 This assumption produces substantially simpler expressions for many of the paper’s results, but is not qualitatively 
important.   4 
  A second key implicit assumption in (1) is that the cost of emissions reductions in one 
state does not depend on emissions reductions in any other state, thus ruling out any cost-side 
spillovers.  This assumption will be relaxed later in the paper. 
  Pollution damage in state i is determined by the function  
(2)  Di ei,E ( ), 
where E is the aggregate nationwide level of emissions, given by 
(3)  E = ei
i ! . 
This damage function is weakly increasing in both arguments, and the second derivatives are 
non-negative. 
  Making damages a function both of local emissions and of national emissions allows this 
model to represent a pollutant with strictly local effects (in which case !Di !ei > 0  and 
!Di !E = 0), one with strictly national effects (in which case !Di !ei = 0  and !Di !E > 0), or 
the most interesting case, a pollutant with both local and national effects (in which case both 
partial derivatives are positive).  This last case could be a single pollutant with both local and 
national effects, or could be two different pollutants, one local and one national, which are 
identically affected by efforts to reduce emissions.
2  
  This model considers two general classes of regulations: command-and-control 
regulation and incentive-based regulation.  And it considers three cases for the division of 
regulation between the two levels of government: a case in which only the national government 
                                                 
2 For example, reducing motor vehicle use will reduce emissions of local air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and will simultaneously reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
which contributes to global climate change.  Because other methods of reducing emissions will affect these 
pollutants differently (e.g., a catalytic converter reduces NOx and VOCs, but has no effect on CO2 emissions), the 
assumption that these pollutants are perfectly correlated is not strictly realistic.  But it represents a convenient 
simplification.     5 
regulates emissions, a case in which only the state governments regulate emissions, and a case in 
which both levels of government regulate simultaneously. 
Under command-and-control regulation, the government chooses a cap on emissions.  
The emissions cap set by state i is denoted qi .  The cap set by the national government on 
emissions from state i is denoted Qi .  For the cases in which only one level of government 
regulates emissions, under command-and-control regulation ei  will equal the emissions cap qi  
or Qi .  For the case in which both levels of government simultaneously regulate emissions using 
command-and-control, emissions will be determined by the tighter standard, and thus 
(4)  ei = min qi,Qi ( ). 
  Under an emissions tax, the tax rate imposed by the state government is denoted !i , and 
the tax rate imposed by the national government is Ti .  Consumers and firms respond to the tax 
by reducing emissions up to the point where the marginal cost of reducing emissions equals the 




= #i +Ti. 
  Each state government returns all emissions tax revenue lump-sum within its state.  The 
national government also returns emissions tax revenue lump-sum, allocated across states such 
that state i receives the share ri of a marginal dollar of national-level emissions tax revenue, with 
these shares adding up to one:  
(6)    ri
i ! =1. 
  Regulation via a system of tradable permits would look very similar, but !i  and Ti  would 
represent permit prices rather than tax rates, and government would indirectly determine that   6 
permit price by setting the number of permits.  The share ri then represents the fraction of 
permits allocated to state i.  For the cases in which only one level of government regulates 
emissions, tradable permits will yield the same result as taxes.  However, when both levels of 
government regulate emissions, permits may yield a different result, as will be shown later in the 
paper.  
II. Regulation by the National Government 
  This sub-section considers regulation only by the national government.  Many of the 
results in this case are fairly obvious and duplicate some results from the existing literature on 
environmental federalism, but going through them first makes it easier to follow some of the 
less-obvious results that come later. 
  The national government sets regulations to minimize the sum over all states of pollution 
damage plus the costs of reducing emissions, given by 
(7)  Ci ei ( )+ Di ei,E ( ) ! " # $
i % . 
Note that emissions taxes (state or national) do not appear in this objective.  Those taxes 
represent a cost for polluters, but that cost is exactly offset by the value of the lump-sum return 
of tax revenue.
3  This objective assumes that the national government is attempting to maximize 
efficiency.  Various positive political economy models might suggest alternative objectives, but 
this paper focuses only on cases in which all levels of government aim to maximize welfare for 
their constituents. 
  Under command-and-control, to get the national government’s first-order condition for 
Qi  (the emissions cap on state i), substitute (3) and ei = Qi  into (7), take the derivative with 
                                                 
3 A similar argument applies to tradable permits.   7 









"E j # . 
Thus, the emissions cap will be set such that the marginal cost of emissions reductions in state i 
equals the marginal damage from pollution emissions in state i (which in turn equals the local 
damage in state i plus the national-level effects on all states).  This is the first-best level of 
emissions. 
  Under the emissions tax, the national government’s first-order condition will be the same.  




, set equal to zero, and rearrange to get (8).  The government can then satisfy this 
first-order condition by setting the tax equal to marginal damage: 





!E j " . 
Similarly, the national government could use tradable permits to satisfy (8) by setting up a permit 
system that produces permit prices that follow (9).
4  Thus, any of the instruments can achieve the 
first-best level of emissions in each state, a result that is not at all surprising. 
  Of course, all of this assumes that the national government can set different policies for 
different states.  Suppose instead that it must set policy such that the marginal cost of emissions 
reductions is not differentiated across states: that is, it must set emissions caps such that each 
state faces the same marginal cost of emissions reductions, set the emissions tax to a single 
                                                 
4 Note though that this will in general require either that permits cannot be traded across state lines – in which case 
under this model’s assumptions it is identical to a set of emissions caps – or that such trades occur at a ratio other 
than one-to-one.   8 
national rate, or allow one-for-one permit trading among all states.
5  In this undifferentiated case, 






















"ej j # +
"Dj
"E j # . 
  In this case, marginal cost equals the average marginal damage across states.  Not 
surprisingly, this generally will not yield the first-best level of emissions, because the 
government has only one policy instrument with which to regulate N different externalities. The 
only exception would be the case in which the marginal damage from local pollution 
!Dj
!ej
 is the 
same for all states.  In that case, there is no need for a differentiated policy, because marginal 
damage is the same everywhere. 
  This undifferentiated case could also represent a case in which the government can 
differentiate policy, but knows only the aggregate distribution of damage functions and is 
uncertain about any particular state’s damage function.  This would also lead to the first-order 
condition in (10). 
III. Regulation by State Governments 
  In the absence of federal regulation, each state government sets regulations to minimize 
the cost to that state of reducing emissions plus pollution damage to that state: 
(11)  Ci ei ( )+ Di ei,E ( ). 
                                                 
5 The constraint that national policy cannot be differentiated across states is commonly assumed in the 
environmental federalism literature, and parallels similar assumptions in the broader fiscal federalism literature (see 
Oates, 1999).  Often for an emissions cap this assumption requires that the cap be equal across states.  But this is 
highly unrealistic: command-and-control policies are applied at the firm or facility level, and thus it seems more 
reasonable to assume that they equalize marginal costs across states than that they equalize the quantity of emissions 
across states.  It also means that in the absence of state policy, an undifferentiated national emissions cap achieves 
the same allocation of emissions as an undifferentiated tax or permit system.  Equalizing costs in this way makes it 
easier to focus on other differences among instruments.     9 
  Just as in the national case, state-level emissions taxes don’t appear in the objective 
function, because the value of the returned revenue exactly offsets the cost of the tax.  Note also 
that the incidence of emissions taxes and emissions control expenses in state i is assumed to fall 
entirely on the residents of that state.
6  
  Following the same set of steps as in the national government case shows that the first-











Thus, states will set emissions such that marginal cost equals marginal damage, but including 
only damage within the state, not damage to other states.  As in the national government case, the 
first-order condition under the emissions tax or emissions permits is the same as under 
command-and-control, and can be satisfied by setting the tax rate equal to marginal damage (the 
right-hand side of 12) or setting the quantity of permits such that the permit price equals 
marginal damage.  Under any type of regulation, state regulation will generally not achieve the 
first-best, because state-level regulation fails to take into account damage to other states.  Only in 
the case of a strictly local pollutant (for which 
!Di
!E
= 0 ) will state-level regulation yield a first-
best outcome.  This is an example of the well-known result that local regulation is not efficient 
when there are inter-jurisdictional spillovers. 
IV. Regulation by Both National and State Governments 
  This sub-section considers the cases in which both the national and state governments 
simultaneously regulate the same pollutant.  For simplicity, this is modeled as a one-shot, 
                                                 
6 There are many reasons why some portion of the costs of emissions taxes or control expenses might fall on those 
outside the state (e.g., if pollution-intensive production uses a fixed factor owned in part by out-of-state residents).  
But it is useful to focus on the case in which the cost is borne entirely within the state.   10 
simultaneous-move game.  That is, this section focuses on the Nash equilibria (or refinements 
thereof) of games in which the national government and all state governments simultaneously set 
environmental policy. 
A. Simultaneous Regulation under Emissions Caps 
  First, consider the case in which the states and national government choose emissions 
caps simultaneously.  The Nash equilibrium strategy for the national government will minimize 
its objective (7), taking state policies as given.  If the national government chooses a higher 
emissions cap than the state does (i.e., Qi > qi), then the national cap won’t bind, and a marginal 
change in Qi  will have no effect.  If the national cap does bind, then the national government’s 
first-order condition is the same as when only the national government regulates emissions, 
which is equation (8).  Therefore, setting the national caps based on (8) is a weakly dominant 
strategy. 
  The equilibrium strategy for each state government will be similar.  If the state cap is 
looser than the national cap, then it won’t bind.  If the state cap does bind, then the state 
government’s first-order condition is the same as when only the state government regulates, 
which is equation (12).  Thus, setting the state cap based on (12) is a weakly dominant strategy.
 7 
  Examination of (8) and (12) shows that if 
!Dj
!E j"i # > 0 , or in other words, if there are 
harmful spillovers to other states, then the national cap for state i will be set more tightly than the 
state cap.  Thus, the Nash equilibrium allocation of emissions will be the same as if only the 
                                                 
7 Because these strategies are only weakly dominant, there are many Nash equilibria: one in which all governments 
choose weakly dominant strategies, plus many others in which one or more non-binding caps are set at levels other 
than the weakly dominant level.  A trembling-hand refinement eliminates the latter type of equilibrium.  More 
importantly, all of these equilibria yield the same allocation of emissions.   11 
national government were regulating emissions, which achieves the first-best, as shown earlier.
 8 
The same outcome will occur if the national government imposes emissions caps and the state 
governments use emissions taxes (or tradable permits). 
  Now consider the case in which the national government is constrained to use an 
undifferentiated cap (again, this does not imply that each state is constrained to the same amount 
of emissions, but that the marginal cost of emissions reductions is constrained to be equal across 
states).  Just as in the differentiated case, only the tighter emissions cap will bind.  In this case 






















"ej j+# $ +
"Dj
"E j $ , 
where !  is the set of states for which the national cap will bind and N! is the number of states 
in that set.  This condition is similar to the analogous condition for the case in which only the 
national government regulates emissions, equation (10), except that rather than averaging 
marginal damages over all states, the average covers only those states in which the national cap 
will bind, because those are the only states in which the national cap has any effect on emissions.  
  The equilibrium strategy for each state government remains the same as in the 
differentiated case: the weakly dominant strategy is to set the state cap based on (12), the same 
first-order condition as in the case in which only the states regulate emissions.  And as before, 
the state first-order condition would be the same if the national government uses an emissions 
cap and the states use emissions taxes. 
                                                 
8 If the net spillovers are positive (i.e., 
!Dj
!E j"i # < 0 ) for at least one state, then this equilibrium will not achieve the 
first-best, because that state will set too tight a cap.  But in that case, the national government could restore the first-
best outcome by setting an emissions floor for that state.   12 
  Comparing (12) and (13) shows that in equilibrium, the national cap will bind in every 








!ej j#" $ +
!Dj
!E j%i $ . 
That is, the national cap will be set more tightly than the state cap if local damages in state i are 
less than the average local marginal damages in states where the national cap binds plus the total 
over all states other than i of the marginal damage from aggregate emissions.  The intuition is 
that spillover damages push the national government to set the cap tighter than what individual 
states would choose, but because the national cap is set based on the average marginal damage 
for states affected by that cap, a state with relatively high local marginal damages may want to 
set a tighter cap.
9 
  This equilibrium will generally not yield the first-best emissions allocation, except if 
local marginal damages are equal for all states in which the national cap binds, and spillovers are 
zero for all states in which the state cap binds.  Nonetheless, as long as spillovers aren’t positive, 
this equilibrium will be at least as efficient as the case in which the national government uses an 
undifferentiated policy and states don’t regulate, because in any case in which the state caps 
bind, they will move the level of emissions closer to the efficient level. 








!ej j#i $ <
!Dj
!E j#i $ % i , 
                                                 
9 Note that again there may be multiple Nash equilibria, and in this case they can lead to different emissions 
allocations, because the right-hand sides of (13) and (14) depend on the set of states in which the national cap binds.  
A trembling-hand refinement eliminates nearly all of these, because it rules out any equilibria in which a state 
chooses a weakly dominated level of its emissions cap.  Even with this refinement, there may be multiple levels of 
the national cap that satisfy (13), each with a different set of states in which the national cap is binding.  However, 
the national government will generally prefer one of these over the others, leading to a unique equilibrium.    13 
that is, if for every state, the difference in local marginal damages between that state and the 
average is smaller than the marginal damage aggregate emissions cause in other states.  This will 
tend to occur when there is relatively little heterogeneity across states in local marginal damage 
or when spillovers are relatively large. 
  Expression (15) suggests that cases in which states impose tighter standards than the 
federal cap may well be relatively rare.  And it also suggests that these cases will appear most 
often for pollutants that are primarily local and for which the local marginal damages vary 
substantially across states. 
  Cases in which U.S. states have set tighter regulations than the federal standards do 
appear to be relatively rare, but Oates (2001, p. 15) cites a few examples.  These include the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and 
hazardous waste disposal rules under the Resource Conservation and Recovery act.  In each case, 
these are largely local pollutants.  And it is quite plausible that local marginal damages could 
vary significantly across states.  Thus, these cases seem consistent with the model’s results. 
B. Simultaneous Regulation under Emissions Taxes 
  Next, consider the case in which both state and national governments regulate emissions 
via emissions taxes.  In the differentiated case, the national government’s first-order condition 
will again follow equation (8), the same first-order condition as in all of the differentiated cases 
considered thus far.  In this case, though, satisfying (8) requires setting the emissions tax equal to 
marginal damage minus the state emissions tax rate: 





!E j " #$i   14 
  The state government’s first-order condition will differ from previous cases because the 
state’s objective changes somewhat in the presence of a national emissions tax.  The national 
pollution tax appears in the state’s objective, because the national taxes paid by that state are not 
necessarily offset by the revenue returned to that state.  Just as before, the objective includes the 
cost to that state of reducing emissions plus pollution damage in that state.  But in this case it 
also adds the national emissions tax paid by that state net of the national emissions tax revenue 
returned to it. Thus, state i’s objective becomes 
(17)  Ci ei ( )+ Di ei,E ( )+Tiei ! ri Tjej
j " . 
  To get the first-order condition for state i, follow the same set of steps used to derive the 










+ 1! ri ( )Ti, 
This equates the marginal cost of reducing emissions with the marginal pollution damage within 
the state, plus the national emissions tax rate (net of return transfers to the state).  This first-order 
condition can be satisfied by setting the state emissions tax rate equal to the right-hand side of 
(18) minus the national emissions tax rate Ti : 






# riTi . 
  The unique Nash-equilibrium tax rates are then defined by the intersection of the two 
reaction functions (16) and (19), which yields 




"E j#i $  
and   15 










"E j$i % . 
The national emissions tax is set so that the tax rate, net of return transfers to the state, equals the 
spillover marginal damage to other states, thus fully internalizing the inter-state externality.  The 
state tax rate then fully internalizes the intra-state externality: the tax rate equals marginal 
damage within the state minus the increase in transfers to the state caused by a marginal increase 
in emissions.  This yields a first-best allocation of emissions.  And in general, it will entail non-
zero tax rates from both levels of government.
10 
  Now consider the undifferentiated case.  The national government’s first-order condition 
in this case is  














i " . 
This sets the tax equal to the average across states of marginal damage minus the state tax rate.
  The states’ first-order conditions are the same as in the differentiated case, so the state 
emissions taxes follow (19).  Again, the unique Nash-equilibrium tax rates are defined by the 
intersection of the reaction functions (in this case, (19) and (22)).  This gives 
(23)  T =
!Dj
!E j "  
and 








"E j $ . 
In equilibrium, the national tax rate is set equal to the marginal damage from aggregate 
emissions E.  If national emissions tax revenue were not returned to states, then this would over-
                                                 
10 For sufficiently high ri, this equilibrium will yield a state-level subsidy rather than a tax, though in practice, this 
might be politically infeasible.   16 
correct the inter-state externality (which is 
!Dj
!E j"i # ).  When the effect of that returned revenue is 
taken into account, this rate net of revenue returned equals the inter-state externality for the 
average state, though it may over-correct or under-correct for any particular state.  And as in the 
differentiated case, the state tax rate fully internalizes the intra-state externality: the tax rate 
equals marginal damage within the state minus the increase in transfers to the state caused by a 
marginal increase in emissions.   
  Unlike in the case of emissions caps, in this case it is very likely that states will want to 
impose their own emissions taxes in addition to the national tax.  The second and third terms on 
the right-hand side of (24) will sum to zero for the average state, suggesting that for a pollutant 
that causes any local damage, the average state will want to impose its own emissions tax.   
  It is difficult to find an example of a U.S. tax that is a pure environmental tax, but the 
taxes on gasoline and other motor fuels are probably the closest.  If one broadens the definition 
to include other externalities, then this class would also include various “sin taxes” such as taxes 
on alcohol and tobacco.  In every one of these cases, there is a federal tax and nearly every state 
government adds an additional tax of its own. 
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"Dj
"E j $ . 
If the fraction of marginal emissions tax revenue returned to a state is the same as that state’s 




!E j " ), then this 
undifferentiated tax will yield the first-best level of emissions in state i.  In this case, the national   17 
tax net of returned revenue exactly equals the inter-state externality, thus fully internalizing that 
externality.   
  If ri is higher than this, then the combined tax rate will be less than marginal damages, 
and the level of emissions will exceed the first-best level.  With a higher share of national 
emissions tax revenue being returned, the state has too little incentive to cut back emissions, and 
thus the combined tax rate is too low.  For a lower value of ri, the opposite logic applies: the 
state has too much incentive to reduce emissions and thus the combined rate is too high. 
  Note that this case may in some cases be less efficient than the earlier case in which the 




 varies little across states, but ri
!Dj
!E j " #
!Di
!E
 varies widely, then if the 
national government uses an undifferentiated tax it will be more efficient not to allow states to 
impose their own emissions taxes.  Nonetheless, in most cases it will be more efficient to have 
simultaneous taxation by both levels of government, particularly if ri
!Dj
!E j " #
!Di
!E
 is relatively 




!E j " , then 
simultaneous taxation can achieve the first-best.
11  
  These results also suggest a potentially major problem with proposals for an 
internationally-harmonized carbon price, such as those in Nordhaus (2006) or Cramton and Stoft 
(2010).  These proposals are equivalent to an undifferentiated global carbon tax with the revenue 
raised in each country returned in full to that country (which in this model is equivalent to having 
                                                 
11 Note that if the national government can freely choose the values of ri, then the national policy is not really 
undifferentiated: the national tax rate is the same for all states, but policy can still be differentiated through the 
choices of ri.   18 
ri =1).  The results here suggest that in this case, each country would choose to impose a local 
subsidy on carbon emissions to bring down the shadow price on emissions to equal the damage 
just within that country (which for the case of carbon is a very small fraction of the total 
damage).  The proposals would not allow local emissions subsidies, but this incentive would 
remain and thus one would expect countries to adopt policies with similar effects (e.g., 
subsidizing carbon-intensive industries or under-regulating emissions of other pollutants that are 
strongly correlated with carbon emissions).  This problem goes away if the carbon tax revenue is 
pooled across all nations and then divided up, which would give an ri much less than 1, but 
unfortunately that would also eliminate a number of the advantages of these proposals. 
C. Simultaneous Regulation under Tradable Permits 
  Next, consider the case in which both state and national governments regulate emissions 
via tradable emissions permits.
12  In the differentiated case, the national government can achieve 
the first-best with a system that doesn’t allow permit trading across state lines, by setting the 
number of permits in each state to satisfy (8), the same first-order condition that applies in the 
differentiated case under emissions caps or emissions taxes.  The equilibrium then is exactly the 
same as the equilibrium under differentiated emissions caps discussed earlier in the paper.
13 
  For the undifferentiated permit policy, start by considering the case in which at least one 
state does not impose a binding state-level permit system.  In this case, the national 
government’s first-order condition is the same as (13), the first-order condition in the case with 
an undifferentiated emissions cap together with state regulation, with one subtle difference: here, 
                                                 
12 All of the results in this section also hold if the national government uses tradable permits and states can impose 
emissions caps. 
 
13 The equilibrium is substantially more complicated under a differentiated permit system that permits trading across 
state lines, but at ratios other than one-to-one.  But that case will also produce a first-best allocation of emissions.     19 
!  is the set of states for which the state regulation does not bind and thus emissions are 
determined by the national permit system (in that previous case, !  was described as the set for 
which the national cap binds, but here because of trading the national permits will bind either on 
all states or on none).  The intuition is also the same as in that previous case: the quantity of 
permits will be set such that the permit price will equal marginal damage, averaged over the 
states where emissions are determined by the national permit system. 
  To get the state first-order condition, take a total derivative of the state objective (17) 
with respect to ei , set equal to zero, and note that as long as the national permit system binds, the 












Lowering emissions raises emissions control costs, but also lowers local damages and reduces 
the amount spent on emissions permits.  That tradeoff gives the left-hand side of (26) and the 
first two terms on the right-hand side.  The last term recognizes that the state may gain or lose 
from decreasing the price of national emissions permits, depending on whether it is a net buyer 
or seller of permits. 
  Rewriting that last term using ! , the elasticity of demand for national emissions permits 
with respect to the permit price, and substituting in the national first-order condition (13) give an 
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  Note that this case can easily be less efficient than if states were not allowed to impose 
their own emissions regulations.  The national permit price already corrects for marginal damage 
in the average state without a binding state permit system, and thus adding an additional state 
constraint will tend to push emissions below the efficient level.  The second and third terms on 
the right-hand side of (27) together equal the efficient shadow price on emissions.  Therefore, 
unless the fourth term is sufficiently negative to offset the first term, emissions will be held 
below the efficient level.   
  This suggests that when the national government uses a tradable permit system, it may 
well want to forbid states from imposing their own tighter regulations.  And unlike in the case of 
emissions taxes, setting ri can’t entirely solve the problem: there is no way to set ri such that (27
) yields the efficient level of emissions for every state. 
  These results also suggest a likely conflict with states.  The state first-order condition can 
be rewritten to show that the state permit price will follow 














State i will impose a binding state-level permit system (i.e., !i > 0) as long as the effect of 
lowering the national permit price (the second term in (28)) is not sufficiently negative to offset 
the gain from lowering local pollution damage (the first term).  For the average state, the second 
term will be zero, so for a pollutant that causes any local damage, there will necessarily be at 
least one state for which !i > 0.   
  It is possible for the right-hand side of (28) to be positive for all states, indicating that all 
states would choose to reduce pollution below what the national system alone would do.  But this 
would create a contradiction, because in that case the national permit system would not bind, and   21 
the derivations of (26) through (28) assume that it does.  In this case there is a complicated set of 
equilibria in which the national government and all states impose permit systems, with the 
quantity of national permits exactly equaling the total number of state permits, and thus all are 
binding.  If the second term on the right-hand side of (28) is sufficiently small for all states, then 
there is a unique trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium that yields the first-best allocation of 
emissions.  Nonetheless, this equilibrium is quite complex and fragile, and seems unlikely to 
occur in practice.  Thus, the case already considered, in which at least one state does not impose 
its own permit system, seems much more realistic. 
  The most prominent example of a national permit-trading system in the U.S. is the sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) trading program imposed by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Appendix A 
of Potoski (2001) provides a table showing for each of six criteria air pollutants (SO2, 
particulates, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide, and lead) which states have imposed a 
tighter standard than the federal government.  Of these six, only SO2 is currently covered by a 
national-level permit trading system, while the others are covered by federal standards.  This 
model would then suggest that it is more likely for states to impose tighter limits on SO2 than on 
the other five pollutants. 
  Indeed, this is what the data show.  Nine states have imposed their own tighter standards 
on SO2, and for four of those states, SO2 is the only one of the six pollutants for which the state 
set a tighter standard.  In contrast, only one state (Hawaii, which is not covered by the SO2 
trading program) set its own tighter standard for any of the other five criteria pollutants but did 
not also set a tighter standard for SO2.  This pattern is particularly notable because of these six 
pollutants, SO2 is the least localized, and thus if all six were regulated in the same way at the 
national level, SO2 would be the one least likely to face more stringent state standards.   22 
  Another notable national example of pollution trading was the phase-out of leaded 
gasoline.  That program allowed trading among gasoline refiners from 1982-87.  But it was 
effectively a trading program even before that, because the standard required each refiner to keep 
the average level of lead in the gasoline it produced below a given level, thus effectively 
allowing trading within each firm.  If each refining firm sells gasoline in multiple states, this 
produces state-level incentives that are essentially the same as under a full trading program.  The 
national-level regulations on leaded gasoline were announced in 1973 and took effect (after 
being delayed by litigation) in 1976.  And in 1976, California imposed its own tighter standard 
on lead in gasoline. 
  Similarly, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards do not allow trading 
across different manufacturers, but do average across the vehicles produced by a given 
manufacturer, and thus provide state-level incentives very similar to those under a tradable 
permit program.  Thus, this model would predict that one or more states would choose to impose 
their own tighter fuel economy regulations.  However, the national CAFE rules specifically 
forbid states from imposing their own fuel economy rules.  But to the extent that states can get 
around that rule by imposing other regulations that improve fuel economy, this model would 
predict that at least some would do so.   
  That is exactly what California tried to do by imposing a greenhouse-gas-per-mile limit, 
which was then copied by thirteen other states.  And that limit was challenged by the federal 
government because it was effectively equivalent to a fuel economy standard.  Goulder et al. 
(2009) argues that this effort was misguided and not in those states’ best interest.  The model   23 
suggests that the opposite may be true: those states’ mistake may not have been in imposing 
those rules, but in not having imposed them sooner.
14   
V. Conclusions 
  This paper has shown that state governments are much more likely to set their own 
binding environmental regulations when federal regulation uses emissions taxes or tradable 
permits than when it uses emissions caps.  Under an undifferentiated federal emissions cap, 
tighter state regulations will necessarily improve welfare.  Under a tax, state regulations may 
reduce welfare, but will be more likely to improve it (and to produce an outcome that is more 
efficient than under a federal emissions cap), particularly if each state’s share of federal 
emissions tax revenue is relatively close to its share of marginal damages from aggregate 
national emissions.  Under emissions permits, however, the opposite is true: while state 
regulations can improve welfare, they are more likely to reduce it (and produce a resulting 
outcome that can easily be less efficient than under either taxes or command-and-control). 
  These results provide yet another argument in favor of emissions taxes over command-
and-control regulation, at least at the federal level, because the incentives under a federal 
emissions tax make states more likely to impose efficiency-enhancing regulations of their own.  
Conversely, it provides an argument against tradable permits at the federal level, as well as a 
potential argument for not allowing states to impose their own regulations on a pollutant that is 
covered by a national tradable permit system.   
  Given the strong simplifying assumptions made in this paper’s model, a natural direction 
for future research would be to relax some of those assumptions.  In particular, allowing cost 
                                                 
14 This is not to say that this conflict was caused entirely by the factors considered in this paper.  For simplicity, this 
model leaves out many factors that may be important in the real world.  In particular, it assumes that each level of 
government acts to maximize welfare for its citizens, an assumption that many people might question in this case. 
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spillovers (cases in which the cost of reducing emissions in one state depends on emissions 
reductions in other states) could be quite interesting.  Such cost spillovers could result from 
many factors, including technological innovation or interstate trade in polluting inputs or outputs.  
Another natural extension would be to consider how the results would change if firms and/or 
consumers are mobile. 
  And, as noted earlier, the general framework developed in this paper could be used to 
consider federalism in contexts other than environmental policy, such as public good provision 
or income redistribution.  Extending the model in that direction could generate useful insights.  25 
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